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Federal Select Agent Program (FSAP) Severity Spectrum of Regulatory Departures 
 
General Considerations: 
 
Severity Spectrum: Departures from the select agent and toxin regulations are communicated through an inspection report. 
Departures may include findings of low risk as well as findings that may lead to an immediate stoppage of some or all activities. The 
intention of this document is to provide awareness of how FSAP considers severity of inspection findings and provide 
visibility to the application of enforcement options to these findings. 
 
Serious: Departures that are an immediate threat to human, plant, or animal health, animal or plant products, and/or security of 
biological select agents and toxins (BSAT) and those that indicate a need for systemic improvements. In selected cases, an Immediate 
Action Report will be submitted within 10 days from the Monday following the last day of the inspection. Required corrective action may 
include ceasing work or addressing departures within a shortened period of time. Other departures will be reported in the routine 
inspection report submitted within 30 days from the Monday following the last day of the inspection. 
 
Moderate: Departures that have the potential to be a threat to human, plant, or animal health, animal or plant products, and/or 
security of BSAT. If not corrected, such departures will likely impact the safety of humans, animals, and/or plants, animal or plant 
products, and/or security of BSAT and increase the risk of more serious departures.  A routine inspection report will be submitted 
within 30 days from the Monday following the last day of the inspection. 
 
Low: Departures that are unlikely to pose an immediate threat to human, plant, or animal health, animal or plant products, and/or 
security of BSAT but are not consistent with safe and secure standards of practice. If not corrected, such departures degrade the 
culture of safety and security. Repetition of departures may be considered more serious and lead to enforcement actions. A routine 
inspection report will be submitted within 30 days from the Monday following the last day of the inspection. 
  
Federal Select Agent Program (FSAP) Enforcement Options 
 
Revocation: An entity’s registration will be revoked if the FSAP determines that an entity is unwilling or unable to meet the 
requirements of the select agent and toxin regulations such that the entity presents a threat to the safety of humans, animals, plants, 
animal products or plant products; and/or the security of BSAT cannot be maintained even in a storage only capacity. Refer to 
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Section 8 of the select agent and toxin regulations. 
 
Suspension: An entity may be suspended if any regulatory departure presents an imminent danger to the safety of humans, animals, 
and/or plants, animal or plant products, and/or the security of BSAT. Suspension for such regulatory departures is applied entity-wide, 
is communicated through a "cease and desist letter," and is not voluntary. Suspended entities must not conduct activities with select 
agents and toxins, but will be allowed to securely store to prevent theft, loss, or release of the select agents and toxins in their 
possession. All suspensions are referred to external agencies for further investigation (see below for more details). Refer to Section 8 
of the select agent and toxin regulations. 
 
Immediate action: A limited suspension action for a serious regulatory departure that presents a danger to the safety of humans, 
animals, and/or plants, animal or plant products, and/or the security of BSAT that can be mitigated with an immediate stoppage of the 
activity or an immediate change in entity work and/or security practices. This order is communicated through an "immediate action 
letter" that specifies conditions that must be met within a defined period of time. An immediate action order may include a partial 
suspension of an entity to possess, use, or transfer BSAT specific to certain agents/toxins, of the activities of a principal investigator, 
and/or the use of a registered area. 
 
Corrective Action Plan (CAP): Multiple serious, moderate, and/or repeated regulatory departures indicate a systemic failure to 
comply with the requirements of the select agent and toxin regulations. An entity must fully resolve the departures within 30 days from 
receipt of the inspection report; or the entity may develop and implement a CAP to resolve the regulatory departures according to a 
timeline specified by the FSAP. As a part of the CAP program, an entity must submit progress reports in accordance with the timeline 
documenting actions it has taken to correct regulatory departures. The availability to participate in the CAP program is communicated 
through an "opportunity to show cause" letter and is voluntary. 
 
Increased Monitoring: Some specific regulatory departures or a history of repeated regulatory departures may indicate an entity is 
having difficulty complying with the requirements of the select agent and toxin regulations. The FSAP closely monitors implementation 
of corrective actions and may conduct additional onsite inspections. 
 
Referrals: There are two types of referrals for civil penalties: (1) DSAT may make a referral to the HHS OIG with a recommendation 
that the HHS OIG seek civil penalties; and (2) AgSAS may make a referral to the APHIS IES with a recommendation that APHIS seek 
civil penalties. Either DSAT or AgSAS may make a referral to the FBI when DSAT or AgSAS has reason to believe that there has been 
a violation of Federal criminal law. FSAP may make a referral to another Federal Department or Agency when the FSAP has reason to 
believe that a regulation under the jurisdiction of that Department or Agency has been violated. 
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Note: the following examples are not a complete list of departures in these categories. Some of the examples describe 
multiple regulatory departures that individually may represent the level severity or trigger the enforcement action. 
 
 
Severity Regulation Examples of Departures 
 
Serious 
Departure 
 
Registration, 
Section 7 
 
Discovery of BSAT in unregistered space and/or possession of BSAT without approval. The entity conducts work 
with BSAT that is not described on APHIS/CDC Form 1. Possession of Tier 1 BSAT at non-Tier 1 entity and 
requirements of section 11(f) are not in place. 
 
Serious 
Departure 
 
 
Responsible Official, 
Section 9 
 
Failure of entity and RO to ensure compliance with the select agent and toxin regulations, resulting in 
widespread departures. Failure of entity to provide adequate authority to an RO to act on behalf of the entity. 
Failure to report the identification and final disposition of any select agent or toxin contained in a specimen 
presented for diagnosis or verification. 
 
Serious 
Departure 
 
Security, 
Section 11 
Evidence that an entity allowed a non-SRA approved person access to BSAT. Security breach that has the 
potential to result in theft or loss of BSAT. Failure to implement Tier 1 requirements, such as a suitability program 
for personnel with access to Tier 1 BSAT, three physical security barriers to Tier 1 BSAT, and/or functional 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS). 
 
Serious 
Departure 
 
 
Biosafety, Section 12 
Release that has the potential to result in a laboratory-acquired infection in humans without identification of root 
cause and/or releases or repeated incidents to which the entity has failed to take adequate corrective action(s) to 
prevent further containment breaches. Failure to adhere to validated inactivation method. Systemic failure to 
implement the Occupational Health Plan for Tier 1 BSAT, SARS-CoV, or Reconstructed 1918 influenza virus. 
The facility is inadequate for BSAT work conducted (refer to specific examples in immediate action category) 
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Severity Regulation Examples of Departures 
 
Serious 
Departure 
 
Restricted 
Experiments, 
Section 13 
 
Conducting a restricted experiment, or possession of a product of a restricted experiment, without prior approval 
 
Serious 
Departure 
Training, 
Section 15 
Systemic failure to provide refresher training to SRA-approved individuals or training to visitors on a consistent 
basis 
 
Serious 
Departure 
Transfers, 
Section 16 
Transfer of a select agent or regulated quantities of select toxin to another entity without APHIS/CDC Form 2 
authorization 
 
Serious 
Departure 
 
Records, 
Section 17 
BSAT inventory is inaccurate to a degree that material accountability is not possible. Entity does not have a 
system to ensure that records and databases are accurate and their authenticity can be verified, to the extent 
that it cannot be determined if there has been a theft or loss of BSAT. Systemic failure to provide records 
required by section 17 upon request. 
 
Serious 
Departure 
 
Inspections, 
Section 18 
Entity does not allow FSAP inspectors access to any site at which select agent and toxins activities are 
conducted. 
Entity does not allow FSAP inspectors access to and copying of entity select agent and toxin records. 
 
Moderate 
Departure 
 
 
 
Registration, 
Section 7 
Principal investigator designated on the APHIS/CDC Form 1 does not provide scientific/technical oversight of 
BSAT activities. Entity does not report accurate and/or current information for BSAT strains/serotypes on 
APHIS/CDC Form 1. 
 
Moderate 
Departure 
 
Responsible Official, 
Section 9 
 
Annual inspections by the registered entity are not conducted. 
 
Moderate 
Departure 
 
Security, 
Section 11 
Entity fails to provide graded protection to BSAT (e.g., laboratory has false ceiling that can be overcome without 
the use of special tools). A complete inventory audit of BSAT is not conducted upon departure of a principal 
investigator. 
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Severity Regulation Examples of Departures 
 
Moderate 
Departure 
 
 
Biosafety, Section 12 
PPE donning/doffing procedures are not followed. The biosafety plan lacks provisions for intentionally or 
accidentally infected animals/arthropods/plants. The entity works with avian influenza virus but has not 
developed a written personnel quarantine policy. Centrifuges do not have adequate safety cups or sealed rotors 
for BSAT work. 
 
Moderate 
Departure 
 
 
Incident Response, 
Section 14 
 
The incident response plan lacks provisions for intentionally or accidentally infected animals/arthropods/plants. 
The plan has not been coordinated with local responders. The plan does not contain evacuation procedures. 
 
Moderate 
Departure 
 
Training, 
Section 15 
Annual insider threat awareness training is not provided by an entity with Tier 1 BSAT. Refresher training was 
not provided after the entity significantly amended its plans 
 
Moderate 
Departure 
 
Transfers, 
Section 16 
 
Due diligence is not conducted prior to transfers of excluded amounts of select toxin 
 
Moderate 
Departure 
 
Records, 
Section 17 
Visitor entry records do not document name of the escort. BSAT inventory record is missing multiple 
requirements (i.e., lacks source, strain, date of acquisition). Animal/plant/arthropod accounting is incomplete (i.e., 
lacks number, species, location, or final disposition). 
 
Low Departure 
 
 
Registration, Section 7 
Information is not described accurately on the APHIS/CDC Form 1 (i.e. inaccurate administrative information, 
security or laboratory features, etc.). 
 
Low Departure 
 
Responsible Official, 
Section 9 
Annual inspections conducted by the registered entity were incomplete, such as the entity conducted a biosafety 
inspection but did not assess other requirements of the Select Agent and Toxin Regulations. 
 
Low Departure 
 
Security, 
Section 11 
Shipping and receiving procedures are not described in plan. Plan does not contain sufficient information on 
physical security, inventory control or information security systems. A BSAT intra-entity transfer protocol is not 
developed. Annual review of plan is not performed. Annual drills or exercises are not conducted. 
 
Low Departure 
 
Biosafety, 
Section 12 
Signage posted for registered areas containing BSAT is inadequate. Durable leak proof containers are not used 
for transport of BSAT waste. Annual review of plan not performed. Annual drills or exercises not conducted. 
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Severity Regulation Examples of Departures 
 
Low Departure 
 
Incident Response, 
Section 14 
Plan does not contain name(s) of personnel as required by section 14(d). The plan does not fully describe 
incident response procedure(s). Annual review of plan is not performed. Annual drills or exercises are not 
conducted. 
 
Low Departure 
 
Training, 
Section 15 
Training for visitors does not include all select agent and toxin regulatory requirements, such as security, 
biosafety, and/or incident response training. 
 
Low Departure 
 
Records, 
Section 17 
The entity's list of Security Risk Assessment (SRA)-approved personnel is not current or accurate. The BSAT 
inventory record contains transcriptional errors. 
 
Enforcement 
Action 
Regulation Examples of Departures 
None 
Select Agents and 
Toxins Regulations 
Inspection report with no departures cited  - no further action required by entity 
Action 
Required 
Select Agents and 
Toxins Regulations 
 
Inspection report with departures cited - corrective action required by entity 
Increased 
Monitoring 
Select Agents and 
Toxins Regulations 
 
Refer to FSAP increased monitoring definition 
Corrective 
Action Plan 
Select Agents and 
Toxins Regulations 
 
Refer to FSAP Corrective Action Plan (CAP) definition 
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Enforcement 
Action 
Regulation Examples of Departures 
Immediate 
Action 
 
 
Registration, 
Section 7 
Manipulating BSAT in unregistered areas by a single registered principal investigator 
Immediate 
Action 
Registration, 
Section 7 
Use of select toxin under the control of registered principal investigator in unregistered areas and/or by 
personnel without FSAP approval 
Immediate 
Action 
Security, 
Section 11 
Non SRA-approved personnel control access to registered areas and have access to BSAT 
Immediate 
Action 
Security, 
Section 11 
Three physical security barriers are not in place to safeguard Tier 1 BSAT 
Immediate 
Action 
Biosafety, 
Section 12 
A room/suite is not adequate for the work being conducted and an alternate registered laboratory is not available 
Immediate 
Action 
Biosafety, 
Section 12 
 
Laboratory does not meet the facility criteria for the designated biosafety level, such as inward airflow for BSL-3 
Immediate 
Action 
Biosafety, 
Section 12 
BSC certification record, or cabinet airflow observations, do not confirm that the cabinet maintains primary 
containment 
Immediate 
Action 
Biosafety, 
Section 12 
 
Decontamination systems such as autoclave or effluent decontamination system (EDS) are currently inoperable 
Immediate 
Action 
Biosafety, 
Section 12 
Laboratory exhaust HEPA filters failed certification and room exhaust HEPA filtration is required for the agent in 
use 
Immediate 
Action 
Biosafety, 
Section 12 
Use of aerosol generating equipment outside of primary containment 
Immediate 
Action 
Restricted 
Experiments, 
Section 13 
 
Conducting a denied restricted experiment or possession of a product of a denied restricted experiment 
Immediate 
Action 
Records, 
Section 17 
 
BSAT inventory records are inaccurate to a degree that material accountability is not possible 
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Enforcement 
Action 
Regulation Examples of Departures 
Suspension 
 
Registration, 
Section 7 
Working with BSAT in unregistered space by more than one registered principal investigator and/or unregistered 
individuals 
Suspension  
Suspension, Section 8 
Any departure from the select agent regulations that is considered a present danger to human, plant, or animal 
health, animal or plant products and/or security of BSAT. Refer to Section 8 of the Select Agent and Toxin 
Regulations. 
Suspension 
Responsible Official, 
Section 9 
 
Entity does not have an RO. The suspension is in effect until such time that a new RO is approved 
Suspension 
Security, 
Section 11 
 
Evidence that entity allowed a restricted person access and use of BSAT 
Suspension 
Security, 
Section 11 
 
Security breach is of such high risk that theft or loss is imminent - continuation of work puts BSAT in jeopardy 
Suspension 
Biosafety, 
Section 12 
 
Release that results in laboratory-acquired infection of humans or accidental infection of animals/plants 
Suspension 
Biosafety, 
Section 12 
Release that leaves secondary containment and jeopardizes public health, animals or plants, and/or animal or 
plant products 
Suspension  
Biosafety, 
Section 12 
 
Systemic failure to implement biosafety and containment procedures commensurate with the risk of BSAT such 
that continued failure jeopardizes the safety of humans/animals/plants inside and outside of the laboratory 
Suspension 
Biosafety, 
Section 12 
Failure to adhere to validated inactivation method and product(s) transferred outside of entity, with potential 
exposures to humans/animals/plants 
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Enforcement 
Action 
Regulation Examples of Departures 
Suspension 
 
Transfers, 
Section 16 
Transfer of select agent or regulated quantities of select toxin without APHIS/CDC Form 2 authorization in 
multiple cases 
Suspension 
Records, 
Section 17 
Systemic failure to create, maintain, and produce BSAT records required by the select agent and toxin 
regulations 
Suspension 
Inspections, 
Section 18 
 
Failure to allow inspection in the absence of a reasonable justification 
Suspension 
Select Agents and 
Toxins Regulations 
 
Failure to adhere to a CAP agreement may result in suspension until such time that all departures are resolved 
Revocation 
 
Registration, 
Section 7 
False registration (e.g., entity is not located at address provided on APHIS/CDC Form 1) 
Revocation 
 
 
Revocation, 
Section 8 
Any departure from the select agent regulations that is considered a present danger to human, plant, or animal 
health, animal or plant products and/or security of BSAT and which the entity is unwilling or unable to resolve. 
Refer to Section 8 of the Select Agent and Toxin Regulations. 
Revocation 
 
Security, 
Section 11 
 
Security breach is of such high risk that theft or loss is imminent- continuation of storage of BSAT is in jeopardy. 
Revocation 
 
Transfers, 
Section 16 
Recurrent shipping of BSAT without APHIS/CDC Form 2 to unregistered entity 
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Referral Statute Examples 
FBI 
 18 USC 175b(c) The knowing possession of a select agent or toxin by a unregistered individual or entity 
FBI  
18 USC 175b(b) 
 
The knowing transfer of a select agent or toxin to an unregistered individual or entity 
FBI  
18 USC 175b(a) 
 
The knowing possession of a select agent or toxin by a “restricted person.” 
FBI  
18 USC 175b(a) 
 
The knowing transport of a select agent or toxin by a “restricted person.” 
FBI  
18 USC 1001 
 
Knowing submitting a false or fraudulent document to the FSAP. 
FBI  
Title 18 
Evidence of suspicious activity that may be criminal in nature and related to the entity, its personnel, or its select 
agents or toxins 
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Referral Regulation Examples of Departures 
 
HHS OIG 
and/or APHIS 
IES 
 
 
Select Agents and 
Toxins Regulations 
Registered individual or entity issued a suspension. FSAP will refer regulatory departures resulting in a "cease 
and desist" letter that present an imminent danger to the safety of humans, animals, and/or plants, animal or plant 
products, and/or the security of BSAT.  FSAP may refer regulatory departures that result from an immediate 
action letter and a partial suspension of BSAT activities. 
HHS OIG 
and/or APHIS 
IES 
 
Select Agents and 
Toxins Regulations 
Failure to address regulatory departures cited in a “show cause” letter that resulted in a CAP agreement may 
result in referral. 
HHS OIG 
and/or APHIS 
IES 
 
Select Agents and 
Toxins Regulations 
Any departure from the select agent and toxin regulations or the submission of documentation of a corrective 
action that is associated with the entity’s knowing submission of false information to FSAP. (Note: The knowing 
submission of a false or fraudulent document to the FSAP may also result in a referral to the FBI). 
HHS OIG 
and/or APHIS 
IES 
 
Select Agents and 
Toxins Regulations 
Continued failure to adequately resolve repeated inspection departures (i.e., specific observations noted 
repeatedly on follow-up inspections) that demonstrate a registered entity’s failure to maintain institutional integrity. 
HHS OIG 
and/or APHIS 
IES 
 
Select Agents and 
Toxins Regulations 
Any departure from the select agent regulations that is considered a present danger to human, plant, or animal 
health, animal or plant products and/or security of BSAT. 
 
